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ABSTRACT:  Theories from the economics, management control, and organizational 
behavior literatures predict that when it is difficult to align incentives by contracting on 
output, aligning preferences via employee selection may provide a useful alternative. 
This study investigates this idea empirically using personnel and lending data from a 
financial services organization that implemented a highly decentralized business model. I 
exploit variation in this organization in whether or not employees are selected via 
channels that are likely to sort on the alignment of their preferences with organizational 
objectives. I find that employees selected through such channels are more likely to use 
decision-making authority in the granting and structuring of consumer loans than those 
who are not. Conditional on using decision-making authority, their decisions are also less 
risky ex post. These findings demonstrate employee selection as an important, but 
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1.  Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between employee selection and 
management control outcomes. Theories from economics, accounting, and organizational 
behavior predict that when it is difficult to align incentives by contracting on output, 
aligning preferences via employee selection may provide a useful alternative (Merchant 
1985, Cohen and Pfeffer 1986, Simons 2000, Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005; 
Prendergast 2008). Moreover, there is considerable evidence that organizations devote 
significant resources to employee selection in settings where it is difficult to contract on 
output (Heskett et. al. 1997, 2003; Goodsell 2004). Despite the longstanding nature of 
these theories, the diversity of the disciplines in which they are posited, and their 
apparent importance within organizations, empirical evidence is generally lacking.  
I address this gap using personnel and lending data from a highly decentralized 
organization in which there is a basic management control problem – motivating 
employees to use decision-making authority effectively – that is difficult to solve via 
measuring and contracting on output. I exploit variation within this organization in 
whether or not employees are selected via channels that are likely to sort on the 
alignment of their preferences with organizational objectives.  
In particular, I make use of two features of this organization that give rise to such 
variation. First, the organization underwent a significant change from a highly centralized 
structure to one that is highly decentralized. Many of the employees working in the 
decentralized organization were hired prior to this change while many were hired after it. 
I use the structure that the employee was hired into as an indirect indicator of the extent 
to which his or her preferences are aligned with the decentralized organization’s 
objectives. Second, some employees are screened into the organization via its normal   2
hiring processes while others are referred by existing employees. Prior literature has 
demonstrated that job candidates referred by the firm’s current workers are more likely to 
survive the selection process and tend to have better post-hire career outcomes consistent 
with hires through this channel being better matched to their respective firms (Fernandez 
et al. 2000). In accordance with this literature, I use the referral source of the employee as 
an additional indirect indicator of the extent to which his or her preferences are aligned 
with the decentralized organization’s objectives.  
Using these observable indicators, as well as a unique dataset linking specific 
employees to specific lending decisions, I establish a direct empirical link between the 
channel of employee selection and both aspects of the basic management control problem 
in this setting – the use and performance outcomes of employee decision-making 
authority. In particular, I find that employees selected through “more aligned” channels 
are more likely to use decision-making authority in the granting and structuring of 
consumer loans than those who are not. Conditional on using decision-making authority, 
their decisions are also less risky ex post. I interpret these findings in the context of prior 
literature as demonstrating employee selection as an important, but understudied element 
of organizational control systems.  
This study makes two primary contributions. First, I contribute to the relatively 
large and multidisciplinary literature on employee selection as a management control 
mechanism by providing, to my knowledge, the first direct empirical evidence of a link 
between employee selection and better management control outcomes. In particular, my 
results provide evidence in support of longstanding management accounting-based 
models which posit that control in organizations can be obtained by managing “inputs”   3
(e.g. employee selection) rather than “outputs” (e.g. explicit incentive contracting on 
financial performance) (see Merchant 1985 or Simons 2000 for an articulation of this 
model). Similarly, the findings in this paper generally lend empirical support to emerging 
economic theories on preference alignment as a solution to contracting problems (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2005; Prendergast 2008). 
Second, this paper extends the accounting-based empirical literature on 
organization design. Much of this literature has focused on testing theories about the 
interrelationships between delegation and incentive compensation and on selected 
determinants of these two choices (Nagar 2002, Abernethy et. al. 2004, Moers 2006, 
Campbell et. al. 2009). By focusing exclusively on the explicit incentive compensation 
choice, this research has tended to ignore a variety of other mechanisms that firms might 
use to achieve management control in delegated decision environments. The findings in 
this paper demonstrate that employee selection can be a solution to a fundamental 
accounting problem in many contexts – the difficulty of defining and measuring output – 
that reduces the ability for explicit contracting to solve the delegation problem. 
2.  Prior Literature 
The link between employee selection and better management control outcomes is 
a topic that has been the subject of considerable theoretical research across literatures as 
varied as accounting, economics, and organizational behavior. Within the accounting 
literature, the classic input, process, output model of management control has been a 
mainstay of textbooks for decades (Merchant 1985, Simons 2000). This model, among 
other things, posits that control in organizations can be obtained by managing “inputs,” 
including employees, rather than “outputs” by, for example, explicit incentive contracting 
on financial performance. In this way, input based controls are fundamentally ex ante   4
control mechanisms that are likely to be used when ex post mechanisms of management 
control like explicit performance contracting are difficult or unavailable. Such input 
based controls have also widely been referred to as “personnel controls” (Simons 2000; 
Merchant and Van der Stede 2007).
1  The fundamental insight of these models of control 
is that more effort placed on screening employees at entry means less emphasis need be 
placed on monitoring them once in the organization.  
In the organizational behavior literature, Ouchi (1979) posits a form of 
management control in organizations called “clan control” which has fundamentally 
similar characteristics to input or personnel controls. In particular, his notion of clan 
control focuses on management control via norms, shared values, and routines which are 
facilitated, in part, by the careful selection of employees who are likely to internalize the 
organization’s desired values. In his theory, such clan control will arise when “rational” 
forms of control are unavailable due to difficulty in measuring either behavior or output.    
The economics literature echoes these insights from a different perspective. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) propose a theory of identity in organizations in which 
workers lose utility by deviating from norms of high effort. The model, not surprisingly, 
predicts that workers who “identify” with a firm require less incentive pay to motivate 
effort. Similarly, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) provide experimental evidence that control via 
explicit incentives is costly and likely to be suboptimal relative to trusting agents when 
their “types” are such that they are non-opportunistic and intrinsically motivated.     
                                                 
1 The particular mechanisms through which this type of control is exercised have typically not been well 
specified. A considerable amount of case-based evidence suggests that these mechanisms include but are 
not limited to: (1) carefully designed interview processes and/or systems of referral by existing employees 
(e.g. Heskett et. al. 1997, 2003); (2) training and indoctrination (e.g. Heskett et. al. 1997, 2003; Merchant 
and Van der Stede 2007); and (3) deliberate mechanisms that encourage employee self-selection into and 
out of organizations (e.g. Frei et. al. 2011; Ton 2011).    5
In related work, Prendergast (2008) directly studies the relationship between 
contractibility and hiring preferences. His agency theoretic model predicts that, in the 
absence of perfectly contractible performance measures, organizations will hire “biased” 
agents who are disproportionately motivated to carry out only a subset of what the firm 
cares about with the degree of bias increasing as contracting measures get worse. The 
fundamental insight of his model is that when incentives are difficult to align via explicit 
contracting, aligning preferences through employee selection is a viable alternative.  
Similar notions can be seen in the economics based literature on organizational 
culture as shared values.
2 For example, a key insight of Van den Steen (2010) is that (1) 
all agency problems essentially arise from differences in objectives and (2) shared beliefs 
and values reduce or eliminate such differences. While not making the link to employee 
selection per se, his model does support a mechanism through which the selection of 
employees with particular beliefs or values can be a solution to agency problems. 
It is worth noting that the theoretical economics literature focuses on employee 
preferences as the underlying coordination mechanism, but accounting based theories 
define input controls more generally as those that regulate “…the antecedent conditions 
of performance—the knowledge, skills, abilities, values and motives of employees’’ 
(Snell 1992). It is difficult to make clear empirical or even theoretical distinctions 
between constructs such as preferences or ability, and in practice these constructs are 
likely to be strongly related – those with higher abilities or lower costs of effort are also 
likely to have stronger preferences for a given type of work. These distinctions, however, 
are not fundamentally important for this study. Irrespective of whether preferences are 
shaped by or operate independently of ability, it remains an open empirical question 
                                                 
2See Van den Steen 2010 for a thorough review of this literature   6
whether or not agency problems can be effectively mitigated through the presence of 
particular employee types in the absence of incentives for motivating effort.  
While the theoretical literature on the link between employee selection and 
incentive alignment is large and diverse, empirical evidence is generally lacking with the 
exception of a growing literature on referral as a hiring source. This literature provides 
evidence that job candidates referred by an organization’s current workers are more likely 
to survive the selection process and tend to have better post-hire career outcomes than 
non-referred counterparts. One reason posited is that the referrer screens the applicant 
based on superior information, thus providing a more appropriate match for the 
organization. Theoretically, referral may be associated with nepotism which could hinder 
performance (Goldberg 1982). However, on balance the existing evidence favors the idea 
that this hiring source provides better matches between employees and firms (Fernandez 
et al. 2000). As described later, I rely on referral source to proxy for the extent to which 
employee and organizational preferences are aligned.  
3.  Research Setting and Data 
The research site for this study is a federal credit-union with approximately $1.3 
billion in assets, 130,000 members, 328 employees, and 23 branches operating in a single 
state in the U.S.
3 The organization offers traditional financial products and services and 
counts national banks, community banks, and other credit unions as major competitors. 
The data for this study comes from the organization’s personnel and lending records 
during the period January 2005-May 2010. Throughout this period, this organization, 
when compared either to a peer group of same-state credit unions or to a national peer 
                                                 
3 Credit unions are a form of depository institution that function largely like traditional banks but differ in 
that they are mutually owned and organized by their depositors. Due to this mutual ownership structure, 
credit unions typically refer to customers as “members”.    7
group of similar size, has consistently ranked in the top 15% in productivity (revenue per 
employee), loan default rates (2
nd lowest), and overall performance (return-on-assets).   
The most salient aspect of the organization for this study is a significant change 
undertaken in its business model and management control systems by the end of 2004. 
From this period onward, traditional centralized policies for everything from waiving fees 
to underwriting loans were replaced by a framework that radically decentralized decision-
making authority. Throughout this paper, I refer to the business model implemented in 
the period after 2004 as the “new system” and that implemented on or before 2004 as the 
“old system”. The new system has many features that are consistent with the theoretical 
literature on employee selection and organizational identity discussed above. Namely, 
output is difficult to measure and contract on, alignment of employee and organizational 
interests is important, and the selection of employees with particular attributes is 
increasingly relied on as a mechanism to solve this alignment problem.    
3.1 Difficulty Measuring and Contracting on Output 
The new system has two interrelated characteristics that give rise to challenges in 
measuring and contracting on output: (1) objectives are stated in relatively intangible 
terms and (2) financial outcomes are expected to occur over relatively long time horizons. 
Underscoring both of these, the new system was implemented with an objective of 
“building relationships founded on trust” with a belief that focusing on building 
relationships through member advocacy and service would lead to long-term value 
creation for both the member and the organization.  
Attendant with this objective was a focus on putting members first in decision-
making. To facilitate this “member-first” philosophy, authority over virtually any   8
decision involving a member was heavily decentralized. For example, a relevant excerpt 
from internal documents that were used to communicate the change to employees read: 
No employee will ever get in trouble for doing what is right for the member 
[bold emphasis in original document]… Do not consider the system capability, 
policy, or procedure – err on doing whatever is necessary for the member and 
allow your manager or supervisor to take care of the rest. Finally, be prepared to 
defend your decision! If your intention is to do what is right for the member, you 
have the support of management and your co-workers. 
 
The decentralization of decision-making authority would have its most immediate effect 
on the organization’s lending practices. As one executive explained: “Employees were 
given full latitude on rates and overriding our underwriting guidelines. Even [tellers] had 
this authority”. By contrast, automated risk scoring methodologies were used under the 
old system to determine who could or could not get a loan with the institution.  
As a mechanism for guiding employee decisions, the organization’s “member-
first” philosophy was explicitly codified in a framework internally referred to as 
“Member, Organization, Employee,” or “MOE”. Extensive efforts were undertaken to 
communicate this framework, and the following excerpt from one internal document used 
in these efforts explains the concept: 
… MOE was introduced as a tool to help you determine what is right for the 
member. MOE – Member, Organization, Employee is your guide. Not sure 
what’s right in a particular situation? Run it through MOE – in priority order – 
remembering that the member always comes first and trumps the other two. In 
other words, if a solution is right for the employee or the organization but does 
not position the member for future success, we will not proceed. [Italic emphasis 
in original communication] 
 
The most important aspect of this framework is that it explicitly prioritizes the 
customer in the decision-making process, yet also asks employees to consider the 
organization when making decisions. The implementation of the MOE framework, and 
the attendant decision-authority delegated to employees, is a rather explicit recognition 
by the top executive team that it is difficult to measure and manage centrally in the new   9
system due to the intangible nature of objectives such as “building relationships,” 
generating “trust” among members, and “putting the member first”. Decentralized 
decision-making authority, along with the MOE framework, places the interpretation of 
these objectives and the assessment of their tradeoffs with organizational performance in 
the hands of individual employees. In short, contracting measures are relatively difficult 
to develop and apply in the new system. This is in contrast to the old system in which 
standard performance metrics, such as the number of additional products sold, were used 
to evaluate individuals and business units.  
3.2 Alignment of Employee and Organizational Interests 
The new system yields an obvious incentive alignment problem: motivating 
employees to use decision-making authority in service provision and to do so in a way 
that leads to better financial performance in the future. Both aspects of this incentive 
alignment problem can be seen early in the implementation of the new system.  
Speaking to the challenge of getting employees to use decision-making authority, the 
CEO noted that “We communicated to employees extensively that you are empowered, 
you can circumvent controls, and we really want more exceptions. Yet, hesitance to 
deviate from standard protocols was pervasive.”  Another senior executive attributed 
much of the reluctance among employees to the organization’s previous control systems. 
She elaborated: “Controls were extremely tight here. Our divisions were run as fiefdoms. 
You couldn’t even get a fee waived for a member without going through accounting”.  
  The second part of the incentive problem, motivating employees to use decision-
making authority effectively, was also apparent early in the new system. While well 
intentioned, much of the early decision-making by employees was not well directed. One 
senior executive elaborated: “There was a period early on where employees were doing   10
crazy things like driving across the state to help members… and underwriting $18 loans. 
We had to ask ourselves: how do we direct this engagement without dampening it?”    
Addressing this problem led the organization to adopt many practices that prior 
literature would predict to find in organizations where outcomes are difficult to measure 
and contract on. Most important from the perspective of this paper is an increasing 
reliance on employee selection. However, I first describe two other mechanisms here to 
provide a more complete picture of the research setting.  
First, and consistent with literature in both accounting and economics, the use of 
subjective performance evaluation is relied on extensively (Baker et. al. 1994, Ittner et. 
al. 1994, Gibbs et. al. 2004). Each of the organization’s business unit “leaders” is 
accountable for ranking the performance of individuals on their team. Subjective 
performance rankings of employees are based on factors such as how well they were 
making decisions on behalf of members rather than focusing on policy or procedure and 
on how well they could articulate the rationales for their decisions. Based on this 
assessment, employees are assigned a performance rating ranging from “A+” to “C”. 
Each business unit leader is then assigned a bonus pool based on the size and overall 
performance of their team during that year. Each leader then allocates a dollar amount to 
each employee based on the performance ranking. Subjective performance evaluation of 
this type has been in place throughout the implementation of the new system.
4   
Second, there is extensive reliance in this organization on norms and shared 
values to guide employee behavior (Ouchi 1979, Van den Steen 2010). Norms for 
decision-making have evolved at this organization via at least three mechanisms. The 
                                                 
4 In unreported tests, I examined these subjective ratings to test for implicit incentives that might influence 
employee decisions. I find no evidence of such implicit incentives. The likelihood of a lower rating shows 
no significant relationship to any of my measures of employee use of decision-making authority.    11
first, as discussed above, is the articulation of the “MOE” decision-framework. It is worth 
noting that at least by 2009, employees seem to have developed a relatively nuanced and 
sophisticated interpretation of how to apply the MOE decision-filter. Qualitative evidence 
of this can be seen in Appendix A where I have provided a random sample of responses 
to a question on a survey conducted by the organization across its entire employee base.  
The question, designed to elicit employees’ understanding of the extent of their 
decision-making authority as well as its proper application, was posed as follows: “An 
employee comes to you with a member situation that, if the decision is made to go ahead 
with the request, will require working “outside the box”. What advice would give the 
employee on decision making and execution?” Consistent with the development of 
norms, the answers to this question reveal several common elements across employees as 
follows: (1) Employees by and large view very few, if any, limits on the decisions they 
can make on the behalf of members. (2) Employees do not tend to interpret the MOE 
framework naively. Rather than doing whatever the member asks for, employees 
carefully deliberate whether a course of action is in the long-run best interest of the 
member and believe that doing so will also be in the long-run best interest of the 
organization. (3) Employees appear to hold themselves accountable for following up with 
decisions after they are made, both in the short and long-term, to ensure the desired 
outcome for both the member and the organization.  
The second mechanism for norm development is straightforward. Based on my 
own interviews and direct observation of work at this organization, employees interact 
extensively with each other when faced with significant exceptions – both to elicit the   12
views of others who have made such exceptions in the past as well as to sharpen their 
own rationale for making or not making the exception.  
The third mechanism for norm development is due to what is referred to internally 
as a “detection control” model which functions by allowing employees to deviate from 
formal guidelines, but requires them to explain and document their decisions when they 
do so. One executive captured the workings of this control system as follows: 
We flag loans that are outside of our lending guidelines. If there is a rate 
exception, then the employee should log the explanation in [our internal IT 
system]. If they don’t, we will have a discussion with the manager to make sure 
the documentation is in the system going forward. If they put the explanation in 
[the system], then we don’t review the exception further.  
 
Importantly, this process emphasizes enforcing the documentation of employee rationales 
for deviation from guidelines rather than monitoring the outcomes of individual 
decisions. This was a deliberate choice under the assumption that questioning individual 
outcomes would effectively eliminate willingness to exercise decision-making authority.
5 
The system does, however, maintain a record of the full history of employee explanations 
for any lending or other decisions that deviate from formal guidelines. In this way, the 
system facilitates the development of norms by maintaining an archive of past rationales 
that any employee facing the choice to make an exception can access to see how similar 
decisions have been handled in the past.  
While this control system does not punish or reward employees for loan 
outcomes, top management does monitor trends in exception rates over time for risk 
management purposes. An internal risk management committee conducts periodic 
reviews to identify trends for employees with severe deviations in either the rate or 
                                                 
5 This assumption is consistent with the literature on “psychological safety” in organizations (Edmondson 
1999) as well as studies on employee behavior under different monitoring regimes (Campbell et. al. 2011).   13
magnitude of their exceptions. In these instances, mentorship and coaching are used to 
instill decision-making norms that are more aligned with the overall risk tolerance of the 
organization.  
  In short, the organization uses a variety of mechanisms to motivate the effective 
use of decision-making authority, all of which are consistent with practices that prior 
literature would predict to find in organizations where it is difficult to measure and 
contract on outcomes. Similarly, and most importantly from the perspective of this paper, 
this organization has increasingly relied on employee selection.            
3.3 Employee Selection 
The employee selection process at this organization mirrors its basic incentive 
alignment problem of motivating employees to use decision-making authority and to do 
so effectively. In particular, the organization has actively sought to select employees with 
particular attributes that are indicative of underlying preferences for these objectives.  
In my own interviews with executives and employees, a primary attribute that 
surfaced as important could best be described as “empathy”. Variously described in terms 
such as “a desire to help others” and “wants to make an impact on others,” this attribute is 
clearly seen as an indicator for a potential employee’s desire to make decisions on behalf 
of members. Given the high degree of decentralization in the new system, other attributes 
that are viewed as important are confidence in decision-making, willingness to take 
ownership and accept accountability, willingness to take risk, and a desire to learn.
6 The 
organization’s interview process naturally attempts to screen on these attributes. Typical 
interview questions include “If our computer system was down and a member walked in 
and asked you for $500 in cash for the trip they were leaving on the very next day, how 
                                                 
6 Appendix B provides qualitative evidence on employee perceptions of the importance of these attributes.   14
would you make that decision?”; “How do you want to be remembered by coworkers and 
by customers?”; and “How have you changed as an employee in the past couple of 
positions that you've held?”.  
Considerable emphasis is also placed on screening new hires once in the 
organization to quickly identify those who are overconfident or otherwise likely to be 
poor fits with the new system. Particular attention is paid to employees hired from other 
financial institutions to determine their ability to change and adapt to the environment of 
the new system. Commenting on this mechanism, one senior executive noted: “All new 
employees are assigned a mentor who they work closely with in decision-making during 
the first few months of their employment. Mentors can and have quickly identified 
employees whose behavior does not respond to coaching and mentoring.” 
3.4 Measuring Alignment of Employee Preferences with Organizational Objectives 
A feature of this organization that I exploit in my empirical tests is that employees 
are selected via different channels – some of which are more likely than others to sort on 
the alignment of their preferences with organizational objectives. Many employees in the 
new system are continuing employees that were initially hired into the old system. The 
system that these employees were selected into is an almost polar opposite management 
control environment, and they were screened based on very different attributes than are 
considered important in the new system such as prior experience in financial services. 
Under the new system, the executive team had come to believe that past experience in 
another financial institution could be detrimental for a candidate attempting to transition 
to their model. Consistently, the organization recruited new employees from areas as 
diverse as healthcare, retail, and education. The implicit assumption is that employees   15
selected from traditional financial services organizations will be too influenced by their 
own previous experience and the control structures in which they operated.  
    For all intents and purposes, employees hired prior to year-end 2004 (“old 
system employees”) were initially selected into a traditional financial services 
organization with policy and procedure oriented controls. Relative to employees that are 
hired into the new system, I expect that old system employees will have preferences that 
are less aligned with the organization’s objectives. This is, of course, tempered by the 
fact that these employees chose to remain in the new system. However, the fact that an 
employee was hired into the old system should be a reasonable indirect observable 
indicator that his or her preferences are relatively less aligned than those of employees 
directly hired into the new system (“new system employees”).
7        
There are also several relevant distinctions among new system employees. Some 
are referred into the organization by existing employees and some come through the 
normal screening process without referral. Further, of those that are referred, the source 
of referral can be either an old or new system employee. If new system employees 
generally have preferences that are more aligned than those of old system employees, 
then I expect this to extend to referrals as well. Among new system employees, those 
referred by other new system employees should be most aligned, those referred by old 
system employees should be least aligned, and employees who are screened without 
referral are likely to fall in between. Old system employees may also have been referred 
by other employees when hired into the old system. To the extent that this led to the 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with Van den Steen’s (2010) economic model of culture as shared beliefs in the context 
of mergers. Predictions from his model suggest the use of a person’s pre-merger firm as an indirect, but 
observable, indicator of his or her beliefs. To the extent that those who select or are selected to stay have 
preferences that are relatively well aligned with organizational objectives under the “new system”, this 
should bias against my ability to identify empirical differences in employee decision-making patterns.    16
strongest sorting of employees who “fit” with the old system, I expect such employees to 
have the least aligned preferences with the new system.   
It is worth considering that if old system employees which remain in the new 
system are concentrated among those with lower ability – as might be expected if they 
have weaker outside opportunities for instance – the structure that the employee was 
hired into may serve as an indirect indicator of general skill levels rather than alignment 
of his or her preferences with the organization’s objectives. However, Table 1 provides 
evidence that this is not the case. The table demonstrates that employees which exited the 
organization during the final year of the old system tended to be those with lower average 
wages suggesting that they are not per se higher skilled or more talented on average than 
their counterparts who stayed. This remains true even within the two largest job 
categories at year-end 2004 – Member Services Representative and Financial Services 
Officer. Similarly, the final column of Table 1 demonstrates that performance ratings for 
executive level employees (“Leaders”) who left by year-end 2004 are on average lower 
than ratings for those who stayed.  
Figure 1 illustrates some salient facts about the evolution of the employee 
selection model at this organization. As of 2005, the first full year of implementation of 
the new system, those hired directly into this system already account for fully 40% of all 
employees. This pattern is consistent with a perceived need for a different “type” of 
employee in the new system. It also indicates significant underlying turnover of old 
system employees as the organization transitioned to the new system. Consistent with 
different preferences under the old system, interviews with executives and other 
employees suggest that approximately half of this turnover was voluntary and due to the   17
discomfort of many old system employees with the level of decision-making authority 
inherent in the new system. The remaining turnover was involuntary as senior 
management used both formal evaluations and informal observation to terminate 
relationships with employees they determined to be least likely to fit well in the new 
decentralized structure. Figure 1 also shows that the percentage of referred employees 
rises from just over 30% to just over 40% during this period. As relevant, but not shown 
in Figure 1, is that by the end of 2009 over 50% of new employees were referred by 
existing employees. These patterns demonstrate increasing reliance on this recruitment 
channel and are consistent with the literature on employee referrals as a high quality 
source of information for matching potential employees to internal labor markets.             
In summary, employee selection has played an increasing role at this organization 
as a mechanism for aligning employee preferences with organizational objectives. I 
expect such alignment to vary systematically with the channel of employee selection with 
the ordering from strongest to weakest alignment as follows: (1) new system employees 
referred by new system employees; (2) new system employees who are not referred; (3) 
new system employees referred by old system employees; (4) old system employees who 
are not referred; and (5) old system employees referred by old system employees. If 
employee selection is an effective solution to the incentive alignment problem, then I 
expect to see more use of decision-making authority, and stronger resulting performance 
outcomes, in moving from the fifth category of employee to the first.  
3.5 The Lending Decision Context 
  While decision-making authority under the new system extends to a wide range of 
decisions that employees might make on behalf of members, I focus on lending decisions 
in my analysis. Lending decisions have significant research advantages over other types   18
of decisions for two reasons. First, employee use of decision-making authority is directly 
observable in this context and might include, for example, giving a member a loan when 
they do not meet formal credit score guidelines. Second, and similarly, performance 
outcomes of these decisions are eventually observable in the form of default and charge-
off rates. Lending decisions are also significant in this industry and represent one of the 
areas in which this organization was most impacted by the change to the new system.  
Although the context of lending decisions provides several advantages for this 
study, it is worth noting that incentive contracts could technically be written on future 
default rates. However, holding lower level employees accountable for long-term 
outcomes over which they have little control outside of the initial risk assessment would 
expose them to a substantial amount of risk potentially making them less willing to use 
decision-making authority irrespective of their judgment about the true quality of a loan.  
This challenge has been articulated as a major barrier to contracting on outcomes 
in the context of bank lending, and studies that have been conducted in this context point 
to the exceeding rarity of this practice with typical incentive contracts based on loan 
originations rather than outcomes (Baker 2002, Agarwal and Wang 2008, Liberti and 
Mian 2009, Liberti et. al. 2010). Irrespective of particular views on the feasibility of 
contracting on loan outcomes, the most relevant fact is that this organization does not do 
so, giving rise to a control problem that must be addressed via other mechanisms. My 
primary analyses examine whether this can be accomplished via employee selection.      
3.6 Data 
The data used for this study are collected from the organization’s personnel and 
lending files during the period January 2005-May 2010. The sample used for subsequent 
analyses consists of observations on loan, borrower, and employee characteristics for   19
134,121 unique loans, made to 64,540 unique borrowers, by 463 unique employees 
during this period. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.  
 Employee Characteristics: Data on employee characteristics include the employee’s 
year of hire into the organization, their job-title, and the business unit in which they 
work.
8 Both job-title and business unit may vary by year. For employees who were 
referred into the organization, I observe the identity and year of hire of the employee’s 
referrer. I use employee and referrer hire years to classify employees into the five 
categories noted above, defining new system employees and referrers as those hired after 
2004 and old system employees and referrers as those hired prior to and including 2004.    
There are 214 unique job titles in the data, but many of these are redundant. For 
analysis purposes I broadly categorize employees as “customer contact” or “corporate 
and back office” based on job titles and their descriptions. Customer contact employees 
are those whose jobs put them in contact with customers in the regular course of work 
including, for example, employees working in branches and call centers. Corporate and 
back office employees largely consist of those working in executive or functional areas at 
corporate headquarters or business units other than branches or call centers.  
While relatively broad, this is a good categorization for a variety of reasons. First, 
consistent with the decentralization of decision-making authority, every employee was 
expected to be capable of handling all transactions so that differences in job-tasks do not 
necessarily track well with differences in job-titles in the new system. This is especially 
true of customer-facing employees operating in branches and call centers as they handle 
the majority of transaction activity. Second, and in recognition of this fact, by 2008 the 
                                                 
8 For purposes of this study, a business unit can be a branch, a function such as financial accounting or real 
estate, or corporate headquarters.    20
organization had itself classified all customer-contact employees into one job-title called 
“Member Service Representative”. Finally, customer-contact employees operate at the 
lowest level of the organizational hierarchy. The significant decentralization of decision-
making authority even to lower levels in the organization is perhaps the most unique 
aspect of the new system, and it is reasonable to expect employee selection to have its 
strongest potential effects on management control and incentive alignment at this level.     
Borrower Characteristics: Data on borrower characteristics include the borrower’s 
credit score and debt-to-income ratio at the time their loan application is processed.  
 Loan Characteristics: For each loan made during 2005-2010, I observe the type, dollar 
amount, interest rate, and term at the time the loan was funded. There are three broad 
categories of loans in the data: secured vehicle loans used primarily for automobile 
purchases; personal lines of credit including credit cards and signature loans; and 
mortgages and home equity loans. The distribution of loans and their characteristics by 
type are provided in Table 3. In addition to these basic characteristics, I also observe loan 
exceptions which are direct indicators for whether an employee exercised decision-
making authority in a particular lending decision. The two basic types of lending 
exceptions are those made in approving, and those made in funding, a loan. 
Loan approval exceptions occur when an employee overrides the organization’s 
system-based guidelines in approving a potential borrower for a loan. In general, in the 
absence of decentralized decision-making authority at this organization, borrowers with 
either credit scores less than 620 or debt-to-income ratios above 45% would not qualify 
for approval. The benchmark of denying a loan to a borrower which falls short of either 
of these criteria serves as the counterfactual for what the lending decision would be in the   21
absence of decision-making authority. This serves as a useful benchmark for examining 
variation in the use and outcomes of decision-making authority across employees. 
Throughout this paper, I use the term “system-deny” to denote loans which would have 
been denied in the absence of decision-making authority.  
I observe loan approval exceptions in the data in two different ways. First, for 
every loan that was approved over the sample period, I can observe whether it is a 
“system-deny” loan. That is, whether it is a loan for which a credit-score exception, debt 
ratio exception, or both were made. This allows me to examine whether these types of 
loans are systematically more or less concentrated among different types of employees. 
In essence, this data allows me to examine the probability that a system-deny loan would 
be observed conditional on having been approved by a particular employee. A clear 
drawback of this measure is that it is a joint-probability of a system-deny borrower 
requesting a loan from the employee and the employee making the exception to approve 
the loan conditional on that request. The focus of this study is on the latter, and in some 
of my tests I will attempt to deal with this issue by controlling for factors that would 
make it more likely for an employee to interact with riskier borrowers.  
I also address this issue via the second way in which I observe loan approval 
exceptions. For the period 2006-2009, I was able to obtain data on all applications from 
potential borrowers who were denied for loans. The data on which specific employees 
made the denial decision are only available for 2007, so most of my analyses of this 
particular data are restricted to this year. While only for a limited portion of my sample 
period, this type of data is not typically available in studies on lending decisions, and it   22
allows me to directly estimate the probability of an employee approving a loan 
conditional on the potential borrower not meeting system criteria for approval.  
The second type of loan exceptions – those made in the structuring of approved 
loans – are relatively more straightforward. These consist primarily of rate exceptions 
occurring when employees structure the loan with a different rate than is recommended 
on the “rate sheet” for a loan with similar characteristics. In the vast majority of cases, 
though not all, the actual interest rate is lower than the rate-sheet rate consistent with 
employees using decision-making authority largely to reduce rates offered to members.  
As additional controls in my analysis of lending decisions, I construct two 
measures of lending experience in the new system. First, I measure the employee’s 
general prior experience with lending decisions in the new system as the cumulative 
number of loans made by the employee up to and excluding the current loan. Second, I 
measure the employee’s experience lending to a specific member as the number of prior 
loans made by the employee to that member. The cumulative number of loans in both 
cases is measured from January 2005 or from the employee’s hire date, whichever is 
later. I include these measures as controls for any potential learning effects over time and 
because employees who repeatedly interact with specific members could reasonably be 
expected to have better “local information” on the member’s credit-worthiness 
independent of the characteristics of the employee.           
Loan Performance Outcomes: I am able to observe whether an outstanding loan is 
charged off between January 2008 and May 2010. A charge-off occurs when a loan is 
written off as uncollectible and is clearly the most extreme outcome of a poor performing 
loan. It would be ideal to have intermediate outcomes such as defaults on payments, but I   23
do not observe such outcomes in this data. While the performance outcome is relatively 
extreme, this data allows for direct tests of the performance implications of employee use 
of decision-making authority in lending decisions.   
4.  Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics on the Use of Decision-Making Authority 
  Before turning to my primary empirical tests, I first examine several patterns in 
the data that illustrate the nature of employee lending decisions. Data in Table 2 and 
Figures 2-4 provide strong evidence that decision-making authority is “real” rather than 
simply formal or perceived.
9 Table 2 shows that 13% of all loans during 2005-2010 were 
made with credit-score exceptions, 24% were structured with interest rate exceptions, and 
fully 73% of loan applications from “system-deny” borrowers were approved in 2007.  
  Figure 2 demonstrates that decision-making authority is also highly dispersed. 
With the exception of 2008, a year in which overall loan applications declined, every 
employee made at least one lending decision and this remained at approximately 90% of 
all employees even in 2008.
10 Moreover, the top 20% of employees in terms of loan 
volume in a given year account for less than 60% of all lending decisions. Lending 
activity would have been highly concentrated in few employees in the old system and the 
ability to make exceptions even more so. Figure 3 shows that, in a typical year, 
approximately 60% of all employees approve more than 25 loans with the number 
ranging widely to well over 500.  
The net effect of this widespread use of decision-making authority, as shown in 
Figure 4, is that the organization is approving many loans that would otherwise be denied 
                                                 
9 I use these terms in the sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997). Real authority would be limited if employees 
perceived the threat of implicit punishments from superiors’ monitoring their use of formal authority. 
10 “Back office” employees get opportunities to make loans due to an IT system that routes any “overflow” 
calls in its call centers randomly throughout the organization. Any employee can receive a randomly routed 
call from a member regarding lending or other transactions and is expected to handle the transaction.      24
by system-rules based on credit scores and debt ratios. The approval rate on such loans 
varies between 60% and 80% from 2006-2009. Employees appear to view credit score 
exceptions as riskier decisions than debt-ratio exceptions as evidenced by the relatively 
lower 50%-70% loan approval rate for borrowers that do not meet credit score criteria.     
 4.2 Does the use of Decision-Making Authority Vary with the Channel of Employee 
Selection? 
Table 4 provides evidence of systematic variation in the use of decision-making 
authority across employee categories. Several patterns in Table 4 are worth noting – 
particularly for customer contact employees. First, all types of employees appear to 
utilize decision-making authority extensively. Even old system employees referred by old 
system employees – the category that is expected to be the most reluctant to use decision-
making authority – approve 71% of loans from system-deny applicants and make rate 
exceptions on 23% of approved loans. Not surprisingly since these employees self-
selected to remain in the organization, they appear to have “adapted” to the new system. 
Despite this, the second pattern of note in Table 4 is that employees hired into the new 
system are significantly more likely to use all types of decision-making authority than old 
system employees. These predictable patterns also remain when comparisons are 
restricted to within new system employees – with those referred by other new system 
employees showing significantly higher loan exception rates across all exception types.  
Some of these general patterns remain for corporate and back office employees, 
particularly the comparisons between old and new system employees. However, there is 
little distinction in the use of decision making authority across loan exception types for 
new system employees who are not referred when compared to those who are referred by 
other new system employees. As noted earlier, it is reasonable to expect employee   25
selection to have stronger effects in this setting among customer-contact employees, but 
these weaker patterns may also be due to smaller sample sizes of employees or loans 
within the corporate and back-office employee group.   
The patterns documented in Table 4 largely remain when lending decisions are 
subjected to a multivariate analysis controlling for factors other than employee 
characteristics that are expected to influence these decisions. Table 5, Panel A, reports 
estimates from logit models for the different categories of lending exceptions for the 
sample of customer-contact employees. The excluded category in each model is old 
system referred by old system employees. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, all 
models include fixed effects for loan-type, business unit, and year. Reported standard 
errors are corrected for clustering of observations within employees prior to inference.  
The first column contains results for the model predicting the probability of an 
approved loan being one for which a credit score exception was made. The results 
demonstrate that loans with these exceptions are more likely to be observed if the 
employee making the decision has had prior lending experience with the borrower, and 
are less likely for larger loans. More importantly, the predicted patterns in the use of 
decision-making authority across employees remain: conditional rates of credit-score 
exceptions are higher for new versus old system employees generally, with the highest 
rates demonstrated for new system employees referred by other new system employees.  
These results may be confounded if some employee groups are systematically 
more likely than others to interact with riskier borrowers. This may arise if different types 
of employees are concentrated in particular business units due to the hiring preferences of 
the manager, the local labor market, prior turnover or other factors and if there are   26
systematic differences in the types of borrowers that interact with particular business 
units. By including business unit fixed effects, I partially control for these potential 
confounding factors. However, the types of borrowers interacting with business units 
may change over time. To account for this, the second column in panel A of Table 5 
includes the average credit score of borrowers with loans originated at the business unit 
in the prior year. Not surprisingly, increases in the average credit quality of borrowers 
interacting with a business unit are negatively associated with the likelihood of observing 
a loan with an exception. More importantly, the results on differences in conditional 
exception rates across employee categories are robust to the inclusion of this measure.  
The results in the first two columns of Table 5, Panel A, demonstrate that loans 
with credit score exceptions are more likely to be observed among new system 
employees, particularly those referred by other new system employees. The next column 
shows the flip-side of this, the probability that these employees will accept a loan from a 
borrower who does not meet system criteria. In these tests, I control directly for 
characteristics of the borrower by including the debt-to-income ratio and “credit grade”.
11 
The credit grade, used internally as a way to classify risk, ranges from “A+” to “D”. 
Cutoff values of credit score are used to grade each borrower, with grades “C” and “D” 
consisting of borrowers with scores lower than the system criteria of 620. I use the credit 
grade rather than the score in recognition of the inherent nonlinearity in credit-score 
based lending decisions. The excluded credit grade in these specifications is “B”. Not 
surprisingly, the results show that employees are more likely to approve loans of lower 
dollar amounts for borrowers with higher credit scores and lower debt ratios.  
                                                 
11 Variation in credit scores and debt-ratios arise in this sample because the system-rule would deny 
applicants with either credit scores<620 or debt-ratios>45%.    27
More notably, the coefficient estimates show that the predicted patterns in the use 
of decision-making authority across employee categories remain. The coefficient 
estimates on the employee category indicators from column 3 suggest that, relative to old 
system employees referred by old system employees, the implied marginal effects for 
new system/referred by old system, new system/not referred, and new system/referred by 
new system employees are approximately 3%, 4%, and 8% respectively.  
Turning to decisions on the structuring of loans, the last column in Panel A of 
Table 5 demonstrates that employees are more likely to make interest rate exceptions for 
loans with higher dollar amounts to borrowers with lower credit scores and higher debt 
ratios. Borrowers with lower credit scores and/or higher debt ratios would not normally 
qualify for the organization’s lowest interest rates, so it is not surprising that these are the 
borrowers for whom employees would offer rate reductions. Results on the use of this 
type of decision-making authority across employee categories are not as strong as those 
for loan approval decisions. New system employees referred by new system employees 
show the highest conditional rates of interest rate exceptions followed by new system 
employees referred by old system employees, but non-referred new system employees 
show no significant differences from either category of old system employee. Relative to 
old system employees referred by old system employees, the implied marginal effects for 
new system/referred by old system and new system/referred by new system employees 
are 1.4% and 1.8%. Relative to the 23% mean rate exceptions by old system/referred by 
old system employees, these imply increases of approximately 6% and 8% respectively.          
In general, the results on the sample of corporate and back-office employees in 
Table 5, Panel B are not as strong as those for customer contact employees. This       28
discrepancy may reflect more significant coordination problems among the numerous and 
geographically disperse customer-contact employees, but may also arise due to smaller 
numbers of employees or loans within the corporate and back-office sample.         
Overall, the results in this section provide evidence that the use of decision-
making authority is significantly higher for employees selected via channels that are 
likely to sort on the alignment of their preferences with organizational objectives. I turn 
next to investigating the effectiveness of employee use of decision-making authority.  
4.3 Do Decision-Making Outcomes Vary with the Channel of Employee Selection? 
I examine the effectiveness of decision-making outcomes by investigating 18-
month charge-off rates for “system-deny” loans approved during the period January 
2007-November 2008. I am limited to this relatively short time frame because I only 
observe charge-offs occurring during the period January 2008-April 2010. Summary 
statistics on charge-off rates, both on average and across employee categories, are 
provided in Table 6. Not surprisingly given that they are based on criteria that index the 
ex-ante risk of borrowers, “system deny” loans show a significantly higher mean charge-
off rate of 1.9% compared to 0.4% for those that meet system criteria.  
A potentially better point of comparison would be charge-off rates for loans that 
just meet system criteria for acceptance. These loans would be accepted in the absence of 
decision-making authority but would have ex-ante risk that is closer to that of system-
deny loans. To facilitate this comparison, I examine the subsample of loans which meet 
system criteria for debt-to-income ratios (<45%) but that were made to borrowers with 
credit scores between 620 and 640. These borrowers meet system criteria but are just 
over the threshold credit score cutoff. The mean charge-off rate for this sample of 1.88% 
is almost identical to the 1.9% rate for employee approved system-deny loans. While   29
employees use decision-making authority to approve a significant percentage of system-
deny loans per Figure 4 and Table 2, these results suggest that they do so in a way that 
does not appreciably increase short-term risk relative to system-based lending criteria. 
Turning to differences across employee categories, Table 6 shows a declining 
pattern in charge-off rates as we move from old system/referred by old system to new 
system/referred by new system employees with the latter demonstrating lower rates than 
all other categories. The mean charge-off rate for this category is 0.77%, nearly half that 
of new system/non-referred employees which show the next lowest rate at 1.48%. All 
other categories demonstrate statistically identical mean charge-off rates in excess of 2%.  
The results in Table 7 demonstrate that these patterns generally hold up under 
multivariate analysis. This table contains logit models of 18-month charge-off rates 
conditional on loan, borrower, and employee characteristics along with loan-type and 
year fixed effects for the sample of customer contact employees and for the full sample of 
all employees.
12 Conditional charge-off rates show the same patterns as in the univariate 
analysis with the lowest rates for new system/referred by new system employees 
followed next by new system/non-referred employees. The coefficients for the remaining 
employee categories are statistically indistinguishable from each other.  
Overall, the results in this section provide evidence that is consistent with better 
control and alignment via employee selection. In particular, employees selected through 
channels that are likely to sort on the alignment of their preferences with organizational 
objectives show more effective use of decision-making authority.  
 
                                                 
12 Due to a smaller number of loans in the “Corporate and Back-Office” sample and the infrequent nature of 
charge-offs, I provide the latter analysis to allow comparison of results when these employees are included.    30
5.  Conclusions 
The link between employee selection and better management control outcomes is 
a topic that has been the subject of considerable theoretical research across literatures as 
varied as accounting, economics, and organizational behavior. Yet, it is one for which 
little if any direct empirical evidence exists. By studying a setting in which there is a 
basic incentive alignment problem – motivating employees to use decision-making 
authority and to do so effectively – that is difficult to solve via measuring and contracting 
on output, I am able to provide direct evidence of this link.    
A limitation of this study is that while I demonstrate better control outcomes 
linked to employee selection, I do not investigate the mechanism through which this 
occurs. In delegated decision environments like the one studied here, employees selected 
through more aligned channels may simply have better judgment or invest more effort in 
acquiring local knowledge. Alternatively, such employees may invest more in learning 
about the organization and the resources available to them in carrying out their work. In 
this way, some employees may be better than others at allocating organizational 
resources to achieve desired outcomes. The employee comments in Appendix A, many of 
which focus on the importance of “following up” on decisions, suggest that this is a 
potentially reasonable interpretation for the results in my research setting. Future research 
can make progress by investigating the potential mechanisms through which employee 
selection leads to better management control outcomes.         31
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Table 1: Retained versus Exited Employees in the Old System  
   Mean Hourly Salary Levels by:       
      Salary Type     Job Title       
  
All 










Stayed    $18.80    $32.40    $16.20   $17.86    $15.86            4.56  
Left    17.28*     28.59    15.50**     14.74***   12.64***      4.31***  
Columns 1-5 show average salary levels for employees who stayed and those who left the organization as of year-end 2004 (the final year of the “old system”). The final column 
shows the average performance rating of the organization’s “Leaders” (executive level employees) as of year-end 2004. The performance rating ranges from 1-5 and was intended 
to be a measure of the degree to which each leader was likely to fit with the culture of the “new system.”  *,**,***  denote significant difference in means between employees who 
stayed and those who left within the same employee category at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively. For comparison purposes, pay levels for employees paid on an annual basis 
are expressed on an hourly basis assuming 8 working hours per day and 264 working days per year. Pay levels for hourly employees capture the actual hourly wage rate. Financial 
Services Officers and Member Services Representatives are the two job titles which had the largest numbers of employees as of year-end 2004.      
   36
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Employee, Borrower, and Loan Characteristics 
Variables 
Sample Size and Unit of 
Analysis Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min  Max 
Employee Characteristics  Number Unique Employees 
New System Employee, Referred by New System Employee  463  0.08  0  0.27  0  1 
New System Employee, Not Referred  463  0.27  0  0.45  0  1 
New System Employee, Referred by Old System Employee  463  0.13  0  0.33  0  1 
Old System Employee, Not Referred  463  0.36  0  0.48  0  1 
Old System Employee, Referred by Old System Employee  463  0.16  0  0.37  0  1 
Tenure in Organization (Years)  463  4.21  3  4.75  0  32 
Borrower Characteristics  Number Unique Borrowers 
Credit Score  64,540  710  720  74.59  393  836 
Debt to Income Ratio  64,540  37.92  34.94  21.86  0  200 
Loan Characteristics  Number Unique Loans 
Loan Amount  134,121  13,519  9,000 18,865 25   2,371,200 
Interest Rate  134,121  8.93  8.10  4.06  3  26 
Term in Months  134,121  69  60  36  0  406 
Approved Loan has a Credit Score Exception  134,121  0.13  0  0.33  0  1 
Approved Loan has an Interest Rate Exception  134,121  0.24  0  0.42  0  1 
Loan Application Approved when System Rule would Deny (2007 only)    13,637  0.73  1  0.35  0  1 
Prior Lending Experience of Employee up to Current Loan (# past loans 
made by employee)  134,121  360.71  254  341.45  0  1,752 
Prior Customer-Specific Lending Experience of Employee up to Current 
Loan (# past loans made by employee to a specific customer)  134,121  1.35  0  0.92  0  20 
“New System” denotes employees hired after the organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (post-2004); “Old System” denotes employees hired prior to 
the organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (2004 and earlier); summary statistics for employee characteristics are based on the pooled sample of 
employee-years from 2005-2009;  summary statistics for borrower characteristics are based on the full sample of 134,121 loans; The minimum loan term of 0 is due to the presence 
of revolving credit lines such as credit cards and home equity lines of credit.    37
Table 3: Summary Statistics and Distribution of Loans by Type 
Loan Type 
% of All 
Loans Amount  Interest  Rate  Term 
Secured Vehicle  49%  $13,278  6.88%  61.24 
Personal Line of Credit  37  4,498  12.72  59.90 
Mortgage and Home Equity  14  36,654  6.39  114.72 
Table reports distribution of loans along with means of selected variables by loan type; Summary statistics are based on 
the full sample of 134,121 loans; Term is measured in months.    38
Table 4: Use of Decision-Making Authority by Employee Category 
“New System” denotes employees hired after the organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (post-2004); “Old System” denotes employees hired prior to 
the organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (2004 and earlier); % loans with credit score and interest rate exceptions are based on the full sample of 
134,121 approved loans; “System Denied” refers to loan applications from applicants with credit scores less than 620 or debt to income ratios greater than 45% or both; Approval 
rates for system denied loans are based only on loan applications received during 2007; a,b,c,d
  denote significantly different from old system-referred by old system, old system – 
non referred, new system – referred by old system, and new system – non referred employees respectively at least at the 10% level based on two-sample tests of proportion
  Employee Category 















Customer Contact Employees       
Number of Unique Employees  21  71  39  101  46 
       




       





       




       
Corporate and Back Office Employees       
Number of Unique Employees  41  73  22  40  9 
       





       
2007 Approval Rate for System Denied Applicants  54  57  59  81
a,b,c 77
a,b,c 
       
% Loans with Interest Rate Exceptions  18  23
a 20  26
a,b,c 21
a,d   39
Table 5: Loan Exception Logits 















Prior Lending Experience  -0.0002  -0.0002  0.0009  -0.0001 
(0.0004) (0.0004)  (0.0006)  (0.00007) 
Prior Customer-Specific Lending Experience  0.059***  0.061***  0.24**  0.044*** 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.10)  (0.01) 
Prior Year Average Credit Score for Loans made at 
Business Unit  -0.009*** 
(0.00) 
Credit Grade A+  1.667***  -0.503*** 
(0.25) (0.03) 
Credit Grade A  0.487**  0.02 
(0.22) (0.04) 
Credit Grade C
  -1.018*** 0.340*** 
(0.21) (0.04) 
Credit Grade D  -1.949***  1.317*** 
(0.18) (0.03) 
Debt to Income Ratio  -0.023***  0.00001*** 
(0.002) (0.000004) 
Loan Amount ($000’s)  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.018**  0.01*** 
(0.005) (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.001) 
Old System Employee, Not Referred  0.035  0.031  0.262**  -0.038 
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.03) 





(0.06) (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.04) 




(0.05) (0.05)  (0.13)  (0.03) 






(0.07) (0.07)  (0.42)  (0.06) 
Constant -0.727***  5.688***  20.344  -3.218*** 
(0.19) (0.44)  (0.35)  (0.14) 
Observations 112,997  93,751  10,052  112,997 
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Prior Lending Experience  -0.0006**  -0.0006**  0.002  -0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0017)  (0.0002) 
Prior Customer-Specific Lending Experience  0.02  0.03  -0.72  0.089*** 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.59)  (0.02) 
Prior Year Average Credit Score for Loans 
made at Business Unit  -0.008*** 
(0.00) 
Credit Grade A+  1.061***  -0.670*** 
(0.34) (0.06) 
Credit Grade A  0.841**  0.025 
(0.35) (0.09) 
Credit Grade C  -1.549***  0.204** 
(0.35) (0.10) 
Credit Grade D  -2.723***  1.051*** 
(0.30) (0.08) 
Debt to Income Ratio  -0.031***  0.000003*** 
(0.004) (0.000001) 
 Loan Amount ($000's)   -0.03  -0.03  -0.004  0.003*** 
(0.008) (0.008)  (0.17)  (0.00) 
Old System Employee, Not Referred  0.288***  0.236**  0.158  0.096 
(0.11) (0.11)  (0.22)  (0.07) 
New System Employee Referred by Old 
System Employee  0.166  0.169  0.725**  -0.125 
(0.18) (0.18)  (0.29)  (0.14) 
New System Employee, Not Referred  0.510***  0.462***  0.058  0.061 
(0.14) (0.14)  (0.54)  (0.09) 
New System Employee Referred by New 
System Employee  0.629***  0.570***  0.444  -0.382*** 
(0.18) (0.18)  (0.78)  (0.13) 
Constant 0.222  4.332***  25.328***  -3.104*** 
(1.28) (1.50)  (1.53)  (0.29) 
Observations 21,124  17,526  3,585  21,124 
Standard errors in parentheses corrected for clustering within employees; *,**,***  significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively;  b,c,d
  significantly different from old system – 
non referred, new system – referred by old system, and new system – non referred employees respectively at least at the 10% level based on chi-square tests; business unit, year, 
and loan type indicators included in all specifications. “New System” denotes employees hired after the organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (post-
2004); “Old System” denotes employees hired prior to the organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (2004 and earlier); “System Denied” refers to loan   41
applications from applicants with credit scores less than 620 or debt to income ratios greater than 45% or both; The dependent variable in the column labeled “Credit Score 
Exception | Approved” is an indicator for whether an approved loan is one for which a credit score exception was made in the approval process;  The dependent variable in the 
column labeled “Approve | System would Deny” is an indicator for whether a loan application is approved when the system rule based on credit score and debt-to-income ratio 
would deny the loan; Approval rates for system denied loans are based only on loan applications received during 2007; The dependent variable in the column labeled “Interest Rate 
Exception” is an indicator for whether the actual interest rate is different than the organization’s standard interest rate given the characteristics of the loan and borrower. The 
excluded category for “Credit Grade” is ‘B’ in all specifications. All models include fixed effects for loan-type, business unit, and year  42




















* denotes mean charge-off rates are significantly different from those for loans meeting system criteria  
at less than the 1% level; where the asterisk is absent, this difference is not statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level;   a,b,c,d
 denotes significantly different from old system-referred by old system, 
old system – non referred, new system – referred by old system, and new system – non referred 
employees respectively at least at the 10% level based on two-sample tests of proportion; Charge-off 
rates are calculated based on loans funded during 2007 and 2008 that were charged off within 18 
months. “New System” denotes employees hired after the organization’s implementation of its 
decentralized business model (post-2004); “Old System” denotes employees hired prior to the 
organization’s implementation of its decentralized business model (2004 and earlier)   43
Table 7: Charge-Off Logits 
   Customer Contact Employees  All Employees 
   System Denied 
System Denied - 
Credit Score Only  System Denied 
System Denied - 
Credit Score Only 
Credit Grade A+  -1.133
*** -0.317 
(0.43) (0.29) 
Credit Grade A  -0.537
* -0.265 
(0.30) (0.34) 





(0.28) (0.18)  (0.27)  (0.17) 




Debt to Income Ratio  -0.003  -0.006  0.00004  0.0005 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.00007)  (0.0008) 
Loan Amount ($000’s)  -0.003  -0.04
** 0.004  -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.24) 
Old System Employee, Not Referred  -0.192  -0.168  -0.410
*** -0.424
*** 
(0.15) (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
New System Employee Referred by Old 
System Employee  -0.257  -0.145  -0.433
*** -0.310
* 
(0.18) (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.18) 





(0.15) (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
New System Employee Referred by New 











(0.35) (0.25)  (0.31)  (0.21) 
Observations 18,779  7,016  22,356  8,352 
Standard errors in parentheses corrected for clustering within employees; *,**,***  significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively;  b,c,d
  significantly different from old system-
referred by old system, old system – non referred, new system – referred by old system, and new system – non referred employees respectively at least at the 10% level based on 
two-sample tests of proportion; Charge-off rates are calculated based on loans funded during 2007 and 2008 that were charged off within 18 months. “System Denied” denotes the 
sample of loans made to borrowers with either credit scores less than 620 or debt to income ratios greater than 45%. “System Denied – Credit Score Only” denotes the sample of 
loans made to borrowers with credit scores less than 620 without consideration of the debt-to-income ratio. All models include fixed effects for loan-type and year.   44


















































































































































































































You have been asked to speak with new employees at orientation. What personal 
attributes would you say are important for an employee to be successful at [the 
organization] in the months and years ahead? 
1  Strong desire to help people. Independent thinker and worker. Someone who is not afraid to 
think outside the box. Always, always, always starting with what the member wants. Make 
certain you understand what they are requesting and use active listening. Sometimes a 
member needs our help in this way to determine what they really want. Then don’t ever feel 
like anything is “off the table”. We are empowered people who need to consistently need to 
challenge conventional wisdom in what needs to be done. Each member is unique and need 
to be treated as such and this sometimes requires help in ways that may not be considered 
conventional. Search out as many different resources as you can here at [the organization] 
and look to grow professionally utilizing these resources as we truly control our 
development here 
2  You have to be able to work with an open mind and an open heart. Preconceived notions of 
banking or customer service should be eliminated because we operate differently than any 
other institution I know of. You will have to be ready to adopt change on the fly and be able 
to work without being micromanaged. You will have to trust yourself and be confident in the 
decisions you make, because you are empowered to do what is best for our members! 
3  Personal attributes that I consider important for someone to be successful at [the 
organization] include: being open minded and flexible, non-judgmental, kind, resourceful, 
being a good listener and communicator. Having the ability to relate to others in some way 
and having a strong commitment to the success of our members and the organization 
4  I feel I had one of the best life experiences working at a different financial institution gave 
me a huge insight into what is offered outside of [the organization]. I would ask new 
employees to take a few minutes, examine where they currently bank, but also seek out 
information about local institutions, so that they can see just how different we are, and how 
extraordinary our services are for our members 
5  You need to really have empathy and sympathy for the member. After spending 12 years at a 
community bank, I was disgusted with how some bankers treated less fortunate people or 
customers that were struggling. We never can have that attitude with our members. They 
may have made some poor choices, but bad things happen to good people, and many people 
have never learned how to properly handle finances. By having Empathy and Sympathy for 
people you will want to do what’s right for them. Fortunately, everything is structured at [the 
organization] to help us be straight-forward with our members. We tell them what the rate is 
and why and what our recommendation is 
6  Openness to learning new information is key. Although our commitment to doing what is 
right for the member does not change, how we follow through on the commitment does. In 
the last year the changes in epay, online banking, regulations for home equity loans, and how 
we do first mortgages are examples of how we need to be open to change and learning new 
things to be able to best help our members.  
7  You have to care about people – we can teach you all of the process and procedure pieces we 
want, but if you don’t have the desire to help people you won’t have success at [the 
organization]. [the organization] is an awesome organization to work for and you receive a 
lot of freedom to make decisions for our members every day, however there is a lot of 
accountability that comes with that freedom so you need to have a strong desire and passion 
to push yourself to help others everyday and to put others before yourself 
8  My #1 message would be that you need to be excited to help people and excited to have a 
direct impact on members. No matter what your role is if that is not core to you as a person 
you will not be successful or enjoy working at [the organization]. Whether you are in a 
branch, work in IT or focus is financial accounting you need to have a core belief in what we 
do. If you do not you will always struggle here and never enjoy what we do resulting in poor 
performance   49
Employee 
Comment 
You have been asked to speak with new employees at orientation. What personal 
attributes would you say are important for an employee to be successful at [the 
organization] in the months and years ahead? 
9  I’d say one of the number one attributes to be a successful long-term employee is to be a 
good listener. Our job comes down to a conversation between two people—in that 
conversation you learn so much about the member—what they are passionate about, what 
they are looking to [the organization] for help on. If you’re perceptive and listening, you can 
find out what they’re looking for and the best way to help the member. Another attribute that 
bides well is having empathy and also the ability to be creative and know that not everything 
is black and white at Affinity—we care about our member’s financial future and need to be 
willing to do whatever it takes to get them in a good position.  
10  Open Minded to the difference that we are compared to the last company that you worked 
for Open to learning- we wear so many hats here that you will want to make sure that you 
spend time learning all the roles you that you will be a part of teller, loan office, mortgage 
officer, ect…Good listener - members, other member advisors, and your leader will need 
you to listen to what they are trying to say to you.  
11  Love what you do!, Trust that the organization has given you the empowerment to make the, 
right decisions for our members, Take pleasure in learning something new about our 
members so we can best meet their needs, Must have great interpersonal and customer 
service skills, [the organization] is different from the other places you may have worked! 
12  Flexibility, confidence in your own past experiences, willingness to learn on the fly with no 
formal training classes.  
13  To be successful at [the organization] you need to really care about others and be inspired to 
connect with them and get to know them as people. Be passionate about the opportunity and 
obligation to help make a difference in their lives. You need to enjoy getting outside of 
yourself to help, fully understanding and believing that everyone will be successful by 
putting our members first, then the organization and lastly ourselves. When our members are 
successful that makes for a successful organization and when an organization is successful 
you have successful employees 
14  Having fun, working hard, and doing what is right for each member and their given 
situation. Learn about our members, understand their goals, and your decisions and actions 
will always be correct 
15  Selflessness, openness to change, caring, integrity, being flexible and adaptable to member 
and organizational needs, self motivation, good work ethic. 
16  A strong passion to help others is critical. Employees must be willing to take on risks, and 
not be afraid of doing new things. Change is good, even though it is scary at times. I think 
most importantly, employees need to be themselves and bring their own unique personality 
to [the organization]. It is important to be confident when making decisions, and trust that 
the decisions made will be supported 
17  The empowerment that you have also comes with responsibility. You need to be able to 
make decisions on your own and need to be independent and self-reliant 
18  I personally think that in order to be successful at [the organization] you need to be a 
passionate person. It is also good to be organized. 
19  I think the most important attribute to have is to have self-motivation and the ability to look 
at situations from all different angles. Being able to motivate yourself to learn new things 
and to think outside the box will allow you to go far as a member advisor 
20  There are several personal attributes that I would tell an employee they would need to be 
successful at [the organization]. Here are the ones that I see as most important: Fight to 
serve, Connect with people, Take ownership and maintain accountability without a lot of 
oversight, Trust our members and the organization, Be willing to challenge yourself, your 
peers, and the organization, asking why for the member, Have confidence, despite not ever 
being able to know everything, Know what you can contribute and bring it, Jump in and be 
willing to learn as you go, Be willing to break from the comforts and constraints of the status 
quo, being creative and maintaining high quality performance for our member 
 